In the EU, a more strategic role for imported gas is foreseen in the security of supply and as a backup for the growing renewable energy share. This strategic import should not be under control of Russia and therefore the diversification of the supply routes is more important than ever.
New more isolationistic US policy is expected to aim at self-supply by promoting domestic shale gas production. It seems that the EU cannot rely on the US as back up for its energy policy and has more than before to make its own plan as regards security of supply.
Nord Stream 2 is a purely geopolitical project for the Russian Federation that threatens energy security of Europe and supply diversity on Central and Eastern European (CEE) markets.
The Ukrainian gas transmission system (GTSU) remains the one single route of gas transit to Europe that is not controlled by Russia (Gazprom), unlike Nord Stream 1 and the corridor through Belarus. The existence of GTSU, independent from Gazprom, prevents Russian Federation plans to dominate the EU energy market. Gazprom has already announced that if Nord Stream 2 is built, then they will stop using the Ukrainian route (and potentially the Polish route) and will decommission pipelines in Russia carrying gas to Ukraine. This will make GTSU completely non-operational.
Nord Stream 2 would double the capacity of Nord Stream and would create a deliberate overcapacity in the gas transport from Russia to the EU. This investment is indeed economically not justifiable, but most likely based upon geopolitical considerations as it would make it possible to deliver gas to Europe without using the Ukrainian transit infrastructure that is not controlled by Gazprom. Switching supplies to routes fully controlled by Gazprom will give the Kremlin in the long run significant geopolitical leverage vis-à-vis Germany and other EU Member States.
Central and East European countries like Poland, Check, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Moldova will become 100% dependent on Russian good will in terms of availability of imported gas, accessibility and pricing.
This control of Gazprom could also threaten gas supplies for all NATO military contingents throughout Central and East Europe, Germany and Austria.